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TRENDS IN
CHURCH/STATE
LITIGATION
JOHN F. MARKERT, ESQUIRE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
MINNESOTA CATHOLIC CONFERENCE
The subject matter-'"Trends in Church/State Litigation"-could
readily be expanded to cover the entire two day agenda of this meeting.
The scope of this topic could be very broad but time restrains and forces
me to limit it to the field covered by some recent cases. I will basically
discuss 9 recent cases.
By way of background there is a backlog of cases based on the first
amendment dating all the way back to 1878. Some of those cases can be
noted briefly in summary fashion as Selected Cases in Digested Form as
follows:
SELECTED CASES DIGESTED
1. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), unanimously de-
nouncing conduct allegedly religious, i.e., a federal statute making polyg-
amy a crime was unanimously upheld, with Chief Justice Waite's opinion
including a quotation from President Jefferson's letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association that the first amendment's prohibitions resulted in
"building a wall of separation between Church and State," used in the
Everson case, below.
It may be noted that the first amendment's language contains no
"wall of separation," "church," or "state" (this last is, technically, a quib-
ble), but the concept now becomes a constitutional doctrine by judicial
interpretation and application. This has provided the base for much oppo-
sition to the Court's decisions and opinions.
2. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), upholding a federal
construction grant to a hospital operated by a religious order.
3. Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510
(1925), denouncing a state law requiring children between 8 and 16 to
attend only public schools and not parochial or private ones.
4. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), a 5-4 decision,
all Justices agreeing that Jefferson's "wall of separation between Church
and State" was intended by the first amendment's Establishment Clause
(which applied to the states also), but the minority feeling that in this case
such wall had been breached when tax money reimbursed parents for
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transportation by public bus to and from parochial schools. All three opin-
ions are of interest. Justice Black wrote, inter alia, that the amendment
"requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their adver-
sary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it
is to favor them."
In his concurrence in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), Justice
Douglas stated: "The Everson case seems in retrospect to be out of line
with the first amendment," i.e., retroactively, Everson seems now to be a
5-4 opposite decision. Quaere: to what extent is its majority holding a
viable one today? The answer seems to be that it remains valid regardless
of Justice Douglas' disavowal.
5. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948), an 8-1
decision rejecting a "released time" method permitting religious instruc-
tion in the school's rooms by denominational teachers, the dissenter agree-
ing on the broad concepts but not on this particular application. See also
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
6. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), a 6-3 decision, in effect
limiting McCollum to its facts and now, although all Justices still agreed
on the wall-of-separation doctrine, upholding a released time program out-
side the school building, with pupils not so released remaining in school
for their regular classes.
7. Tudor v. Board of Education, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953),
denouncing the free distribution in schools, after school hours, of Gideon
Bibles to pupils who desired them to take home, even with parents' permis-
sion. This is the first decision in this area and the court also permitted
evidence (expert testimony) concerning the harm thereby occasioned to
the children.
8. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), a 6-1 decision rejecting as an
Establishment violation a so-called non-denominational 22-word prayer
required to be given in the public schools, even though nonobserving pupils
might be excused. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion "cannot say that
to authorize this prayer is to establish a religion in the strictly historic
meaning of those words;" he also quoted in a footnote the "many 'aids' to
religion in this country at all levels of government."
9. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), an 8-1
decision declaring two state statutes violated the Establishment Clause by
requiring the reading, without comment, of the Lord's Prayer or Bible
passages daily in public schools at opening exercises, even though parents,
upon written request, could have their children excused (the dissenter
feeling the appellate record was inadequate and desiring to remand for
further hearings). The majority opinion quotes from an unpublished opin-
ion of a century ago that "the ideal of our people as to religious freedom
[is] one of absolute equality before the law of all religious opinions and
sects . . . . The government is neutral, and, while protecting all, it prefers
none, and it disparages none."
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10. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), holding no
Establishment violation under the Schempp test where New York lent
state-approved textbooks to all secondary school children. See also Coch-
ran v. Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930), upholding a state's supply-
ing of non-religious texts to all children, not to schools.
11. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), denouncing as an Es-
tablishment violation a state law making it unlawful for teachers in state-
supported schools to teach "that mankind ascended or descended from a
lower order of animals," i.e., an anti-evolution statute (Justice Harlan
concurred on the Establishment rationale but Justices Black and Stewart
concurred because of the statute's vagueness, the former feeling the First
amendment questions "troublesome").
12. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970), eight Justices
upholding a state tax exemption for property "used exclusively for reli-
gious, educational or charitable purposes."
13. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)(Lemon I), and 411 U.S.
192 (1973)(Lemon II), as well as Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
Lemon I held unconstitutional Pennsylvania's reimbursement to
"nonpublic, sectarian schools for their expenditures on teachers' salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials used in specified 'secular' courses,"
and Rhode Island's direct supplement to all teachers qualifying therefor
and on certain conditions of 15% of their annual salary; the reason was the
required continuing supervision would foster excessive entanglement be-
tween the state and religion. Lemon II affirmed the denial of an injunction
whereby the earlier successful challengers to the statute now sought to
prevent the payment of funds to reimburse the aided schools for expenses
incurred in reliance on the statute prior to its invalidation, i.e., the chal-
lengers now lost.
After Lemon , Pennsylvania enacted a statute reimbursing parents
for part of tuition expenses when sending their children to nonpublic
schools. Sloan v. Lemon now also denounced this (6-3, the dissenters being
the Chief Justice and Justices White and Rehnquist). See also Levitt v.
Committee, 413 U.S. 472 (1973), and Committee v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973).
14. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). The federal Higher
Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided for federal grants for construc-
tion of buildings and "academic facilities" to be used for secular educa-
tional purposes and expressly excluded such facilities for sectarian instruc-
tion or as a place for religious worship. The United States retained a 20-
year interest in all such facilities. If the grant recipient violated the condi-
tions during such 20 years, the government would recover moneys under a
formula. Five Justices upheld the "facilities" provision because it did not
have the primary effect of aiding religious purposes of church-related insti-
tutions, even though they received some benefits; eight Justices denounced
that portion of the statute providing for the 20-year limitation on the
religious-use restrictions.
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15. Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty,
413 U.S. 472 (1973), denouncing New York's reimbursement to qualifying
private schools for certain testing and record-keeping costs mandated by
the state, and not permitting payments for religious worship or instruction,
as the aid for the secular functions was not identified and separated from
the aid to sectarian activities (referring to and relying on the Nyquist
decision, below, for "some of the same constitutional flaws. . .") Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall would apply the Nyquist holding without
more; Justice White dissented.
See also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973). Quaere: Does this Levitt
reasoning imply that if, to repeat, if there had been a sufficient (satisfac-
tory) identification and separation, then the reimbursements would have
been upheld?
16. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). A New York statute provided for: (1) direct
state grants to qualifying nonpublic schools for maintenance and repair of
facilities and equipment; (2) tuition reimbursement to parents of children
attending elementary and secondary nonpublic schools; and (3) state in-
come tax relief to such parents. Eight Justices denounced (1) as the pay-
ments were not restricted exclusively for secular purposes; six Justices
invalidated (2) for these reasons; and (3) was rejected by six Justices
because it was insufficiently so restricted. (The Chief Justice and Justice
Rehnquist agreed with the six others in striking down the first, but, with
Justice White now joining them, all three dissented as to the second and
third holdings).
17. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973), a 6-3 decision (dissenters
are Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall), upholding a bond issuance
program, but not to be obligations of the state, by a state-created agency
for the benefit of the Baptist College of Charleston, South Carolina. The
bond proceeds would finance buildings, facilities, etc. but these were not
to be used for sectarian instruction or worship, and the buildings and
facilities would be conveyed to the agency which would lease these back
to the College for ultimate reconveyance when the bonds were fully repaid.
18. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), in which another Penn-
sylvania effort was made, this time partially successful. See Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973). Six
Justices upheld the loan of textbooks without charge to children attending
nonpublic elementary and secondary schools; Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist; six Justices
denounced the loan of instructional material and equipment because
loaned to the schools, and also denounced the furnishing of a professional
staff to provide auxiliary school services because furnished on the premises
of the church-related schools and only when requested by the school au-
thorities; Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Powell; three Justices, who sided in approving the textbook loan, dissented
as to the two other items and would uphold the entire statute; Chief Jus-
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tice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. See also Wolman v. Essex,
417 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Ohio 1976).
19. Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736
(1976), a 5-4 decision. A statute provided for annual non-categorical grants
to state-accredited and qualifying private colleges, including religiously
affiliated ones, subject only to the limitations that the moneys not be used
for sectarian purposes. A three-Justice plurality of the Chief Justice and
Justices Blackmun and Powell would uphold the grants because they did
not foster excessive governmental entanglement, while Justices White and
Rehnquist rejected this third "test" and would uphold because the first
two tests were not violated, i.e., five Justices upheld the grants. Three of
the other four Justices wrote separate, short, dissenting opinions, with
Justice Stewart also joining in the other two and Justice Stevens joining
"substantially" in that of Justice Brennan.
20. Americans United v. Lang, 429 U.S. 1029 (1977), denying certior-
ari when the Missouri Supreme Court upheld a state law which provides
for tuition grants to students attending various public and private colleges,
including some colleges which have religious affiliations. Justice Brennan
would grant certiorari. See Americans United v. Lang, 538 S.W.2d 711
(Mo. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1977).
21. Wolman v. Essex, 429 U.S. 1037 (1977), probable jurisdiction
noted concerning the constitutionality of an Ohio law which provides to
private and parochial school children certain materials, equipment, and
services which are available to children at public schools. The materials
are, under the law, on "loan" to the pupils and their parents and not to
the schools, and some services, e.g., guidance and counseling, are per-
formed off the premises of the schools. In 1976, a lower federal court held
the law to be facially constitutional. See also Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349 (1975); Key v. Doyle, 434 U.S. 59 (1977).
The case involves a so-called "Mortmain Statute" which reads as
follows:
A devise or bequest of real or personal property to a minister, priest, rabbi,
public teacher, or preacher of the gospel, as such, or to a religious sect, order
or denomination, or to or for the support or use, or benefit thereof, or in trust
therefor, is not valid unless it is made at least 30 days before the death of
the testator. D.C. CODE § 18-302 (1973).
The trial court in Estate of French v. Doyle, 365 A.2d 621 (D.C. App.
1976), appeal dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 280 (1977) held:
For the reasons hereafter set forth, this Court hold(s) (sic) that in addition
to being an invalid infringement of the free exercise of religion provisions of
the First Amendment, 18 D.C. Code 302 is also unconstitutional and thus
invalid as a denial of due process guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
(Citation omitted).
The appellate court affirmed that "the statute is invalid under the equal
protection and due process principles of the Fifth Amendment and there-
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fore did not address the First Amendment issues." 365 A.2d at 623.
The fifth amendment rationale was based upon a discriminatory class
distinction created by the statute. The trial court as affirmed held:
"Section 18-302, by its terms, declares void only bequests and devises for
the benefit of religious institutions or the clergy. Testamentary gifts to
non-religious charitable or educational organizations are not included."
365 A.2d at 622.
The equal protection guarantee "requires, at a minimum, that a statutory
classification bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."
. . . "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object
of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike'." . . . The statute in question creates two classes of beneficiaries: one
class composed of clergymen and religious institutions and a second class
encompassing all other beneficiaries. The issue, therefore, is whether this
classification bears any rational relationship to the purpose of the statute.
• . . [T]he District of Columbia statute, as interpreted by the courts, voids
only religious devises or bequests and distinguishes further between gifts to
religious institutions and gifts to charitable organizations owned and oper-
ated by religious institutions, making only the latter valid. There is no ra-
tional basis for presuming that a testator troubled by religious considerations
is likely to make a bequest directly to a church, rather than to a charity run
by the church. Thus, the statute arbitrarily provides different treatment for
similarly situated legatees. Consequently, we conclude that the classification
established by § 18-302 has no rational relationship to the purpose of the
legislation and hence denies religious legatees equal protection of the law.
Id. at 623-24 (citations omitted).
In a special concurring opinion the Chief Judge of the appellate court
felt compelled to observe that the opinion should also be upheld as a
violation of the free exercise clause of the first amendment. He stated:
Its real vulnerability is that it singles out bequests for religious uses in con-
trast to bequests for charitable, educational, artistic, or humane institutions.
According to appellees, the statute's main purpose is to prevent advocates
of traditional religious, particularly the clergy, from influencing the dying by
holding out hopes of salvation or avoidance of damnation in return for gener-
ous gifts to further the practice of religion. But such an objective is precisely
what the 'free exercise' of religion clause of the First Amendment forbids, for
it is premised upon the assumption that such representations are false and
hence Congress can enact safeguards against their effect.
Thus, even though it could be proved (much less presumed) that agents
of the two churches secured these benefits by representations made to the
testatrix as death was imminent, the text of the First Amendment and judi-
cial decisions construing it show that they had a constitutional right to make
them. See, e.g., Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) . . .; Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) . . .; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) . ..; and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) . . . .Accord-
ingly, the statute infringes on rights which the legatees had standing to assert
and therefore cannot stand under the First Amendment.
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365 A.2d at 625-26 (Reilly, Ch. J., concurring). Putnam v. Vath, 340 So.
2d 26 (Ala. 1976).
This case deals with the issue whether the civil courts will assume
jurisdiction of ecclesiastical disputes. Plaintiff is a Catholic priest who had
been suspended by the Defendant as Bishop of the Diocese. The priest
invoked the jurisdiction of the civil courts seeking monetary damages and
declaratory judgment that the Bishop not prevail unless and until a canon-
ical tribunal was convened to hear the priest's complaint. In affirming the
lower court's refusal of the case-as an ecclesiastical dispute which should
not be resolved in civil courts, the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed three
governing cases on this question as rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court,
ranging from 1871 to 1976:
1. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). The Court said
that ". . . we think the rule of action which should govern the civil courts,
founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state
under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of
judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith,
or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of
these churches judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in
their applications to the case before them." 80 -U.S. at 727.
2. In Gonzales v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929), the U.S. Su-
preme Court issued a ruling that raised a possibility of "marginal court
review" as an exception to the Watson Rule. The court said: "In the ab-
sence of fraud, collusion or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church
tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights,
are excepted in litigation before secular as conclusive, because the parties
in interest made them so by contract or otherwise. . . ." The implication
was that the courts might review for fraud, collusion or arbitrariness or for
purity of ecclesiality.
3. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States of America
and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976). In this case the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed an Illinois case based inter alia on the marginal
review concept. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that: (1) the church's
suspension, removal, and defrockment of the bishop must be set aside as
arbitrary because the church proceedings against him had not been con-
ducted in accordance with the court's interpretation of the church's consti-
tution, penal code, and internal regulations, and (2) the church's reorgani-
zation of the diocese was beyond the scope of the church's authority to
effectuate such changes without approval of the diocese. 60 Ill. 2d 477, 328
N.E.2d 268.
In reversing, the U.S. Supreme Court in a 7-2 decision held:
Consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments 'civil courts do not
inquire whether the relevant (hierarchical) church governing body has power
under religious law. . .(to decide'such disputes) . . .Such a determination
. .. frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law
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and usage. To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation
of power within a (hierarchical) church so as to decide. . . religious law...
(governing church policy) . . . would violate the First Amendment in much
the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.' Maryland and
Va. Churches v. Sharpsburgh Church, 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (concurring
opinion). For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made with extensive
inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth
Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the
highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but
must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the
religious issues of doctrine or polity before them.
The First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts
may play in resolving church property disputes, since there is substantial
danger that the state will become entangled in essentially religious controver-
sies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs.
(Headnote 3, 49 L.Ed. 2d 154).
Whether or not there is room for 'marginal civil court review' of church
disputes under the narrow rubrics of 'fraud' or 'collusion' when church tri-
bunals act in bad faith for secular purposes, an 'arbitrariness' exception...
in the sense of an inquiry whether the decision of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regula-
tions-is not consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are
bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organi-
zation of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organiza-
tion, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law; for civil courts to analyze whether
the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are 'arbitrary' inherently
entails inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law suppos-
edly require the church adjudicatory to follow, or else into the substantive
criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question
and such inquiry is the type that the First Amendment prohibits.
(Headnote 5, 49 L.Ed. 2d 154).
Though it did not rely on the 'fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness' exception to
the rule requiring recognition by civil courts of decisions by hierarchical
tribunals, but rather on purported 'neutral principles' for resolving property
disputes in reaching its conclusion that the Mother Church's reorganization
of the American-Canadian Diocese into three Dioceses was invalid, that con-
clusion also contravened the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The reorg-
anization of the Diocese involves solely a matter of internal church govern-
ment, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs. Religious freedom encom-
passes the 'power' (of religious bodies) to decide for themselves, free of state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
The Serbian case has a very interesting dissent by Rehnquist and
Stevens to the effect that the first amendment does not mandate the
Serbian case ruling. This case is well analyzed and discussed in the For-
dham Law Review article made available to all of us at this meeting. See
Note, 46 FORDHAM L. REv. 992 (1977).
.225
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Queen of Angels Hospital v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359, 136 Cal. Rptr.
36, modified, 67 Cal. App. 3d 505 (1977) (mem.).
Plaintiffs are the Queen of Angels Hospital, a California corporation
("Queen"), and the Franciscan Sisters of the Sacred Heart
("Motherhouse"). They filed a declaratory relief action against the Attor-
ney General to determine the validity of a lease agreement, as well as the
legality of an agreement for retirement pay. Plaintiff, Queen, is a non-
profit corporation. Plaintiff, Motherhouse, is a religious order. The hospi-
tal was established in 1927. In 1932, Queen added a ten-floor wing to its
main building. A clinic moved into the new wing. In 1948, Motherhouse
took over operation of the clinic, which remained a separate corporation
until 1958.
In April 1971, Queen's board of directors approved a lease to be effec-
tive May 1, 1971, between Queen as lessor and W.D.C. Services, Inc.,
hospital entrepreneurs, as lessee. Queen leased the hospital excepting the
outpatient clinic and a convent house, to W.D.C. for 25 years with two
options for ten additional years each. Queen intends to use a substantial
portion of the lease proceeds to establish and operate additional medical
clinics in East and South Central Los Angeles. It is not disputed that an
outpatient clinic is not functionally equivalent to a hospital.
In June 1971, the Motherhouse submitted a claim for 16 million dol-
lars for the value of the Sisters' past services to Queen's board of directors.
The board unanimously acknowledged the validity of the claim. In July
1971, an agreement was executed between Queen and the Motherhouse,
effective May 1971, settling and compromising the claim for the Sisters'
past services by agreeing that Queen should pay to the Motherhouse $200
per month for each Sister in the Order over the age of 70 years, plus $200
per month for each lay employee who had worked for the congregation for
over 20 years, not to exceed ten lay employees at any one time. The pen-
sions are payable to all elderly Sisters in the order, whether or not the
particular Sister performed services at Queen of Angels Hospital.
The Attorney General contends that under its articles of incorpora-
tion, Queen held its assets in trust primarily for the purpose of operating
a hospital, and the use of those assets exclusively for outpatient clinics
would constitute an abandonment of Queen's primary charitable purpose
and a diversion of charitable trust assets.
The articles of incorporation, as amended in 1971,1 provides in rele-
vant part as follows:
I In 1946 the articles were again amended to provide for succession in the event of liquidation,
dissolution or abandonment. The named successors were, in order, a Santa Barbara hospital,
a San Francisco hospital, a Los Angeles hospital, and the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los
Angeles.
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First: That the name of said corporation is
QUEEN OF ANGELS HOSPITAL
Second: That the purposes for which said corporation is formed are:
(1) To establish, . . . own, . . . maintain, . . . and operate a hospital in
the City of Los Angeles, . . . to furnish, . . hospital care, . . . and medical
and surgical treatment of every kind and character, and to receive, treat and
care for patients, invalids, the aged and infirm, and generally to conduct and
carry on, and to do all things necessary or advisable in conducting and carry-
ing on a hospital;
(2) To perform and to foster and support acts of Christian charity particu-
larly among the sick and ailing; to practice, foster and encourage religious
beliefs and activities, particularly those of the Holy Roman Catholic Church;
to house and care for unprotected and indigent sick, aged and infirm persons
regardless of race, creed, sex or age;
(3) To educate, ... nurses and medical students, and to provide facilities
for the same;
(4) That it is a corporation which is not formed for pecuniary gain. . . and
any revenue received . . . from the operation and carrying on of said hospital
shall be used in improving the same ...or shall be used in enlarging and
improving said hospital and in enlarging the field and scope of its charitable,
religious and educational activities;
(5) To lease or purchase any real estate, ... which may be necessary,
proper or useful in carrying out the purposes or for the benefit of the hospital,
or as may be deemed to be conducive to the welfare of this corporation;
(6) To .. .receive and hold . ..such . ..property as may be necessary,
useful or advantageous in the carrying out of the general purposes or for the
benefit of the hospital or as may be deemed to be conducive to the welfare
of this corporation. ...
The opinion of the appellate court stated, inter alia:
First, what is most apparent in the articles of incorporation is that the
name of the corporation, Queen of Angels Hospital, describes a 'hospital.'
Second, although-as plaintiffs point out-the articles refer to a plural
'purposes,' the framework of those multiple purposes is the operation of a
hospital. Clinics are not even mentioned. Thus, subclause 1 begins and ends
with the operation of a hospital. Subclause 2, which begins with the perform-
ance of 'acts of Christian charity particularly among the sick and ailing,'
concludes with the conjunctive purpose, 'to house and care' for persons,
suggesting a hospital facility. Subclause 3, which refers to the education of
nurses and medical students, intimates a reference back to the hospital. Most
important, subclause 4 provides that 'any revenue received ...from the
operation and carrying on of said hospital' shall be used either to improve
the hospital or in other charitable religious and educational activities, indi-
cating that the 'hospital' would continue, although other activities might be
added or expanded.
The articles of incorporation alone-without resort to additional evi-
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dence-compel the inference that although Queen is entitled to do many
things besides operating a hospital, essential to all those other activities is
the continued operation of a hospital.
In brief, whatever else Queen of Angels Hospital Corporation may do
under its articles of incorporation, it was intended to and did operate a
hospital and cannot, consistent with the trust imposed upon it, abandon the
operation of the hospital business in favor of clinics . . . The question is not
whether Queen can use some of its assets or the proceeds from the operation
of the hospital for purposes other than running a hospital; it certainly can
and has. The question is whether it can cease to perform the primary purpose
for which it was organized. That, we believe, it cannot do. . . . This corpora-
tion is, however, bound by its articles of incorporation. Queen may maintain
a hospital and retain control over its assets or it may abandon the operation
of a hospital and lose those assets to the successor distributees (supra, fn. 1),
but it cannot do both . . . . The issue is not whether the new and different
purpose is equal to or better than the original purpose, but whether that
purpose is authorized by the articles.
There is no merit to Queen's alternative contention that the statutes
(citation omitted) authorizing the Attorney General to supervise such non-
profit corporations are unconstitutional.
The rule, as most recently stated in In re Metropolitan Baptist Church of
Richmond, Inc., 48 Cal. App. 3d 850, 121 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1975), is one of
neutrality: "Where civil or property rights are involved the courts of this
state have always, evenhandedly, accepted jurisdiction over property dis-
putes, even where ecclesiastical questions may have been indirectly in-
volved." Id. at 859, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 904 (emphasis in original). Where,
as here, the dispute does not require the resolution by civil courts of contro-
versies over religious doctrine and practice, no infringement on the parties'
first amendment rights results. We deal here with a hospital, not a church,
and it is well-established that a religious group may not claim the protec-
tion of the first amendment with respect to its purely secular activities.
Concerning the retirement plan, the trial court made the following relevant
findings:
Plaintiff Franciscan Sisters of the Sacred Heart ("Motherhouse") is an
unincorporated association and a religious order of the Roman Catholic
Church. The property of Queen does not belong to either Motherhouse or the
Roman Catholic Church. From the inception of the hospital through 1971,
services were provided Queen by the Motherhouse and performed by the
Sisters of the Motherhouse. When services were performed, all amounts re-
quested by the Motherhouse for those services were paid by Queen, and
except for such compensation, the services were considered donated to Queen
by both parties. Neither the Motherhouse nor the Sisters expected any fur-
ther or future compensation for those services.
Although the claim for compensation for past services was made in good
faith and was not a dishonest claim, 'there was no basis for such claim and
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neither the Motherhouse nor Queen had a reasonable basis for believing in
the validity of the claim.' The compromise of the claim-e.g., the retirement
plan-was not a proper exercise of sound business judgment or of the fidu-
ciary duties of Queen's Board.
The [trial] court concluded that Queen had no lawful obligation to
repay the Motherhouse, that the compromise agreement was invalid, that the
retirement plan was invalid and that, if implemented, it would constitute a
diversion of charitable assets.
The appellate opinion states:
Although plaintiffs make much of the relationship between Queen and
the Motherhouse and attempt to present this relationship in terms of Roman
Catholic Canon Law, the trial court properly rejected this approach. Plain-
tiffs' assertion that such evidence is material reflects an attempt to bootstrap
a First Amendment argument by citing possibly undisputable evidence con-
cerning the moral and ecclesiastic duties of Queen and the Motherhouse, and
then arguing that whether the retirement plan accords with church doctrine
is an internal ecclesiastical matter. Throughout, plaintiffs have sought the
benefits of and conformed to the general requirements of civil law; they
cannot now decline to be ruled by the principles which Queen has itself
invited. (De La Salle Institute v. United States, supra, 195 F. Supp. 891,
901).
It is important to remember that this case originated in the Superior
Court of California and was appealed to the state court of appeals. The
first few times I read this case I completely missed the last paragraph of
the appellate case which, it turns out, is the only part of the body of the
appellate decision appearing on the last page of the opinion (page 26 as
published by the Court). This paragraph is critical to understand and
analyze this case. It reads: "The Judgment is Reversed." I am told by
counsel from California that this automatically includes by law a remand
and retrial of unsettled law and fact issues as per the appellate opinion.
Accordingly the case is remanded for trial in accord with the opinion of the
appellate court.
In summary, the original Queen's case presented four basic issues
inter alia:
1. Does the United States Constitution First Amendment preclude
the civil courts from assuming jurisdiction of this case as an ecclesiastical
dispute'for internal resolution?
The trial court said "No!" and assumed jurisdiction. The appellate
court affirmed in the body of the opinion.
2. Was the lease of the hospital to W.D.C. legal?
The trial court held the lease to be legal while at the same time declaring
it to be an abandonment of the purpose for which the state charitable
franchise was granted, i.e., to run a hospital. Thus, the funds from the
lease were deemed impressed with a trust and bound to be distributed to
the successor distributees indicated in the dissolution clause of Queen's
articles as amended in 1946.
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The appellate court affirmed in the body of the opinion.
3. Is the compromise settlement of the claim for back wages-i.e.,
the pension plan, legal and enforceable under law as extant in 1971 when
the plan was executed?
The trial court held "No!" The appellate court affirmed in the body
of the opinion.
4. Is the pension plan legal and sustainable under a 1974 law enacted
by the California legislature during the pending of this litigation?
The trial court held "No!" The appellate court said: "We cannot
make the necessary determinations on this record."
National Coalition For Public Education And Religious Liberty v.
Califano, 446 F. Supp. 193 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Pearl v. Califano).
This case is now well known as the constitutional challenge to part of
ESEA (Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
10, as amended by Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 20 U.S.C. §§ 241a-241n
(1976), Title I, providing for services on the premises of nonpublic schools.
The case is still in the developing stages. Motions to intervene were finally
granted after some initial resistance by plaintiffs. The case is now at the
state of discovery proceedings. It is anticipated that a comprehensive re-
cord will be compiled rather than-or in addition to-stipulations. An
educated guess would indicate that it be 2 years before this case would be
handled by the U.S. Supreme Court if it goes that far. Indications are that
the parties involved are grooming this case for the U.S. Supreme Court.
It is interesting to note that the U.S. Solicitor General has filed an
amicus brief with the U.S. Supreme Court in the Wolman v. Essex case.
The intended thrust of the brief is to protect the record for the Califano
case in New York. The brief says in part:
We submit that Title I is fundamentally different from all state and local
programs that offer aid to sectarian schools. The federal government has
extended aid to individual children, without regard to the schools children
attend. Although a state may fulfill its duty of neutrality by opening the
doors of its public schools to all children, the United States does not maintain
a system of public schools that is neutral with respect to religion, the United
States must make its benefits available to students in public and private
schools alike . ...
Because the task of deciding when the Establishment Clause is implicated
in the context of parochial school aid has proved to be a delicate one, usually
requiring a careful evaluation of the facts of the particular case (Wheeler v.
Barrera, supra, 417 U.S. at 426), the United States believes that the court's
decision in this case will not necessarily affect the constitutionality of Title
I.
Brief for Appellant at 6-7, Wolman v. Essex, 430 U.S. 914 (1977) (mem.).
Wamble v. Pierce, U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri,
filed April 4, 1976. The plaintiff is one of the plaintiffs in the Pearl v.
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Califano case pending in N.Y. Federal Courts of the Southern District of
New York.
In the original Wheeler v. Barrera case, 417 U.S. 402 (1974), the U.S.
Supreme court ruled:
1. "Title I evinces a clear intention that state constitutional spending pre-
scriptions not be pre-empted as a condition of accepting federal funds;" and
2. that the questions of: 1. whether Title I funds are public funds within
the meaning of state constitutions, and 2. whether state law permits the use
of public funds to send teachers onto parochial school premises is to be
resolved under state (not federal) law.
In Mallory v. Barrera, 544 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1976) (en banc), the Mis-
souri Supreme Court ruled that Title I funds are subject to the Missouri
Constitution and violated the state's laws and constitution. Thereafter
Congress enacted the so called by-pass provision of Title I, Pub. L. No. 93-
380, 20 U.S.C. § 241e-1(b)(1)-(3) (1976).
Defendants in the Wamble case are Federal and State Education offi-
cials and persons involved in 3 direct contracts with the federal agencies
to affect the by-pass for three programs in three Local Education Agencies
(LEA's).
The complaint alleges that:
1. The three described contracts are unconstitutional for entanglement rea-
sons proscribed under the first amendment.
2. That 20 U.S.C. § 241e-1 and the appropriate regulations authorizing the
by-pass of the State Constitution are unconstitutional because they:
a. Violated the tenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution construed
as reserving education to the state respectively or to the people.
b. Violates the No Establishment Clause of the first amendment in
its function of preventing "Government's sponsorship of religion, Gov-
ernment's financing of religion, or Government's active involvement
with religious institutions and activities"-excessive entanglement.
This case (Wamble v. Pierce) can be viewed as a potential hazard to
the pending Pearl v. Califano case. After reading the complaint there is
reason to speculate that this new litigation is designed to pre-empt Pearl
v. Califano.
What is the status of Barrera litigation in Missouri-before and after
the Title I Congressional by-pass provisions?
The Missouri State Board of Education prepared a state plan which
was approved by the United States district court. That approval was ap-
pealed to the Eighth Circuit which reversed and ordered a new plan,
Barrera v. Wheeler, 475 F.2d 1338, 1348 (8th Cir. 1973). Meanwhile the
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Title I funds were subject to state law.
Barrera v. Wheeler, 417 U.S. 402 (1974). Thereafter the Missouri Supreme
Court issued its decision that Title I violated the state Constitution.
Mallory v. Barrera, 544 S.W.2d 556 (Mo. 1976). At this point the Congres-
sional by-pass provision was invoked to bring forth the three plans under
attack in the Wamble case. In addition a subsequent state by-pass plan
23 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SUMMER 1978
has been proposed and submitted to the court for approval, apparently
under the continuing jurisdiction of Barrera v. Wheeler in the U.S. District
Court, Western Division, District of Missouri (Civil Action 182 48-2). The
proposal appears to be a mockery and is being contested. The Wamble
case, of course, comes after all of this and challenges the plans as well as
the Title I by-pass authorization.
Wolman v. Essex, 417 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Ohio 1976).
This case presents questions concerning, among other things, the pro-
vision of educational services and materials to students of nonpublic
schools. The law in question was tried to a federal district court three judge
panel and that court held it to be constitutional. On appeal the U.S.
Supreme Court has accepted the case. It was argued before the U.S. Su-
preme Court on April 16, 1977. The interest of nonpublic school students
and their parents was pursued by intervention. Mr. David Young of Co-
lumbus, Ohio, is counsel for the intervenors.
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State v. Blanton, 433
F. Supp. 97 (M.D. Tenn. 1977).
In 1974, this court declared unconstitutional the Tennessee Tuition
Grant Program, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-4601-a program which, although
intended to be one of student financial assistance, provided tuition pay-
ments directly to colleges and universities. Americans United v. Dunn, 384
F. Supp. 714 (M.D. Tenn. 1974). This court's judgment was subsequently
vacated by the Supreme Court, and the case was remanded for reconsider-
ation in light of an amendment to the program. 421 U.S. 958 (1975). Before
this court had an opportunity to reconsider its prior judgment, the Tennes-
see Tuition Grant Program was repealed "in its entirety." Preamble, Acts
of 1976, Pub. ch. 415. In its place, the Tennessee General Assembly en-
acted "an entirely new financial assistance program," the Tennessee Stu-
dent Assistance Program, which provides for the payment of awards di-
rectly to needy students.
This case presents a constitutional challenge to the new Tennessee
Student Assistance Program. Plaintiffs claim that the Program violates
both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the first amendment,
as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. They seek a
declaration to that effect and an injunction against the administration of
the Program "insofar as (it) provides for state funds being used for the
benefit of church colleges operated for religious purposes and with religious
requirements for students and faculty."
Both the intervenors and the defendants contend that a program such
as the one at issue, which makes direct financial assistance generally avail-
able to all college students in public and accredited private colleges, is
religiously neutral and offends no constitutional principle.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether the Tennessee Student Assistance Program violates the Es-
tablishment Clause because benefits under the Program are available to
all qualified college students, without regard to whether they attend a
public or private, or a sectarian or non-sectarian, college.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case requires the court to consider whether a program of student
aid is constitutionally different from a program of institutional aid under
the establishment clause of the first amendment. There is no real dispute
on the basic factual characteristics of the aid program at issue in this case.
The crucial question is simply this: What is the proper constitutional
analysis for a program of student aid?
The court's answer to this question will have far-reaching effects. It
will, of course, determine the fate of the Tennessee Student Assistance
Program, presently funded at $1.5 million. But the court's answer will also
necessarily affect the future of such federal student aid programs as the
Basic Educational Opportunity Grant Program (BEOG), the Supplemen-
tal Educational Opportunity Grant Program (SEOG), the National Direct
Student Loan Program (NDSL), and the College Work-Study Pro-
gram-programs that are funded for the current academic year at more
than $2 billion.
This case will probably be governed by the cases of Tilton, Hunt,
Roemer & Poau v. Rogers as applied to its special facts. The facts here are
differentiable in that the aid here flows to needy students rather than the
institutions. Could this be interpreted as a Voucher system? The case has
been submitted and as far as I know is awaiting disposition at the hands
of the court.
Jamestown School Committee v. Schmidt, 427 F. Supp. 97 (D.R.I. 1977).
During the late 60's and early 70's there was a movement in some areas
of the state to change the Catholic school system from a parochial school
system to a regional system. A regional system was one which would serve
only the students in a carefully defined geographical region. In some in-
stances, a regional school system operated only one school in one building.
In other instances, a regional school system would operate many schools
in many buildings. The earmark of all.regional schools was that the area
served by each school crossed town and city lines.
Prior to 1971, state law required and authorized town and city school
committees to transport public and private school pupils between their
homes and schools provided the transportation was entirely within the
limits of the town. In 1971, the General Assembly authorized and directed
towns to provide transportation to students attending non-profit regional
schools, regardless of whether the schools were private or public, and thus
required the busing of students across town lines. The Rhode Island Su-
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preme Court in 1976 ruled the 1971 statute to be in violation of the state
constitution.
In 1976 the General Assembly enacted a new statute, R. I. GEN. LAWS
§ 16-21-2 (Supp. 1977). It required the same transportation as did its
predecessor as long as the distance to be traveled did not exceed fifteen
miles.
The court found that the Rhode Island law places on school commit-
tees-on taxpayers-the requirement that they provide an additional op-
tion to children attending out-of-district nonpublic (i.e., sectarian)
schools. This option is not provided to public school children. Section 16-
21-2 is therefore not a law, like the statute upheld in Everson, which
provides equal benefits to all school children.
The court cites Everson with approval. It also cites the district court
case from Iowa, Poau v. Benton, 413 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Iowa 1975), and
held further: Here, as in Benton, the benefits provided by the challenged
statute fail to meet the requirement announced in Everson and every suc-
ceeding Establishment Clause case in the Supreme Court-that benefits
be provided in common, substantially equally, without distinctions be-
tween children attending sectarian and public schools. The infirmity of the
law is therefore not that any transportation of pupils to religious schools
inevitably "aids" those schools. Section 16-21-2 is infirm because in fact
it affords greater options-greater benefits-to children attending the
quickly increasing number of regionalized religious schools than to chil-
dren attending public schools. It has the effect in fact of transferring a
major cost of regionalization from parents seeking to provide their children
a religious education, and from the religious bodies themselves, to the tax-
payers of the state. This the legislature may not do.
The court held that plaintiffs have succeeded under the third part of
the Lemon test by demonstrating the entanglement of church and state
brought about by the law. The challenged statute will entangle church and
state in two ways. First, because the law clearly permits a single town to
be included in the region served by a number of regionalized schools, the
law will necessitate a great increase in the amount of coordination between
school districts, the state, and sectarian school authorities to determine the
amount of money available for transportation, the number of buses re-
quired, routes, holidays, and so forth. Second, and of greater importance,
the law will inevitably provide successive opportunities for political frag-
mentation and division along religious lines, one of the principal evils
against which the establishment clause was intended to protect. Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. at 372. See also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 622-
23.
By way of summary it is apparent that some of these same issues and
others in varied or nuanced form are in the offing. They can be seen
formulating in the fields of Unemployment Compensation, Civil Rights,
Tax law, and Labor Relations. Questions such as employer identity, appli-
cation of Church principle and dogma in the employer-employee relation-
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ship will or have arisen. Questions of exemption from certain laws will or
have arisen based on this dispute as to whether it applies to the Church
as an institution or to the Church because of its role or function. The
possible result may well be that Church as an institution will be denied
heretofore established rights. Only Church functions as determined by
government (courts or administrative agencies) will be exempt. Currently
there is an ambivalence abroad on this issue. I predict it will come to an
important decision in the next five years.
The real questions are: What is a Church? What do (can) Churches
do-or not do? Who decides these questions-Church or State? Are the
questions decided on the basis of institution or function?
Before closing I would like to indulge in some speculation concerning
the future court decisions touching on the question of education or school
aids to nonpublic school students. In the field of religion (as in others) the
Supreme Court is so confusing and unpredictable that it has become im-
possible to suggest, much less predict, the vote or reasoning of any Justice.
The Justices may believe in the same legal tests but their respective inter-
pretations and applications have been known to vary widely in response
to many dynamics and personal opinions or feelings.
Does the first amendment bar some or all aid for education as Con-
gress and the states may enact? Does the judiciary really possess a veto
over such legislation because of the power to interpret and apply the reli-
gions clause? Assuming arguendo that the answer to both questions is yes,
is it possible to inject or utilize other arguments or logic to overcome the
current refusal of the courts to allow more meaningful educational aids?
The U.S. Supreme Court has recently set more rigid standards for
establishing the unconstitutionality of racial discrimination. Early stat-
utes which allowed different treatments for different races were so bla-
tantly discriminatory that their "facial invalidity" was obvious, i.e., the
intent to discriminate was clear and unambiguous on the face of the law
and it was unconstitutional without application. It followed that statutes
honestly intended and designed to treat all equitably were nevertheless
found unconstitutional if they ultimately and factually resulted in discrim-
ination in their application. The impact or result was the test which con-
trolled where intent was not purely obvious or otherwise provable. Result
was deemed to be the intent regardless of contrary expression.
This logic of the Court is now subject to possible different rationale.
On June 7, 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in a case involving an
examination for D.C. police applicants, that the statute in question was
not illegal because it placed a "substantially disproportionate" burden on
one race; to prove an equal protection violation under the constitution,
there also had to be shown a "racially discriminatory purpose."
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). On January 11, 1977, this
"intent" requirement was applied to the exclusionary suburban zoning. It
was ruled not inherently unconstitutional for a white suburb to change
zoning rules with the practical effect of blocking construction of racially
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integrated housing if such an intent is not facially obvious. Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
If intent can become the guidepost for racial discrimination, why can't
intent control (or at least influence more than it does not) the constitu-
tional question of education aids? Such an application could leave much
more room in the joints of the current three-part test from Schemp, Walz
and related cases. Conversely, it could even be used to tighten up the
joints.
In closing, I would like to especially thank George Reed and the staff
of USCC General Counsel for their assistance.
